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ABSTRACT
The goal of an algorithm substitution attack (ASA), also called a
subversion attack (SA), is to replace an honest implementation of
a cryptographic tool by a subverted one which allows to leak pri-
vate information while generating output indistinguishable from
the honest output. Bellare, Paterson, and Rogaway provided at
CRYPTO ’14 a formal security model to capture this kind of at-
tacks and constructed practically implementable ASAs against a
large class of symmetric encryption schemes. At CCS’15, Ateniese,
Magri, and Venturi extended this model to allow the attackers to
work in a fully-adaptive and continuous fashion and proposed sub-
version attacks against digital signature schemes. Both papers also
showed the impossibility of ASAs in caseswhere the cryptographic
tools are deterministic. Also at CCS’15, Bellare, Jaeger, and Kane
strengthened the original model and proposed a universal ASA
against sufficiently random encryption schemes. In this paper we
analyze ASAs from the perspective of steganography – the well
known concept of hiding the presence of secret messages in le-
gal communications. While a close connection between ASAs and
steganography is known, this lacks a rigorous treatment. We con-
sider the common computational model for secret-key steganogra-
phy and prove that successful ASAs correspond to secure stegosys-
tems on certain channels and vice versa. This formal proof allows
us to conclude that ASAs are stegosystems and to “rediscover” sev-
eral results concerning ASAs known in the steganographic litera-
ture.
KEYWORDS
algorithm substitution attack; subversion attack; steganography;
symmetric encryption scheme; digital signature
1 INTRODUCTION
The publication of secret internal documents of the NSA by Ed-
ward Snowden (see e. g. [4, 14, 21]) allowed the cryptographic com-
munity a unique insight into some well-kept secrets of one of the
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world’s largest security agency. Two conclusions may be drawn
from these reveals:
• On the one hand, even a large organization such as the
NSA seems not to be able to break well established imple-
mentations of cryptographic primitives such as RSA orAES.
• On the other hand, the documents clearly show that the
NSA develops methods and techniques to circumvent the
well established security notions by e. g. manipulating stan-
dardization processes (e. g. issues surrounding the num-
ber generator Dual_EC_DRBG [11, 24, 26]) or reason about
metadata.
This confirms that the security guarantees provided by the crypto-
graphic community are sound, but also indicates that some secu-
rity definitions are too narrow to evade all possible attacks, includ-
ing (non-)intentional improper handling of theoretically sound cryp-
tographic protocols. A very realistic attack which goes beyond the
common framework is a modification of an appropriate implemen-
tation of a secure protocol. The modified implementation should
remain indistinguishable from a truthful one and its aim is to allow
leakage of secret information during subsequent runs of the sub-
verted protocol. Attacks of this kind are known in the literature
[2, 6, 7, 22, 29, 30] and an overview on this topic is given in the
current survey [25] by Schneier et al.
A powerful class of such attacks that we will focus on – coined
secretly embedded trapdoor with universal protection (SETUP) at-
tacks –was presented over twenty years ago by Young and Yung in
the kleptographicmodel framework [29, 30]. Themodel is meant to
capture a situationwhere an adversary (or “big brother” as we shall
occasionally say) has the opportunity to implement (and, indeed,
“mis-implement” or subvert) a basic cryptographic tool. The diffi-
culty in detecting such an attack is based on the hardness of pro-
gram verification. By using closed source software, the user must
trust the developers that their implementation of cryptographic
primitives is truthful and does not contain any backdoors. This is
especially true for hardware-based cryptography [7]. But it is diffi-
cult to verify this property. Even if the software is open source – the
source code is publicly available – the sheer complexity of crypto-
graphic implementations allows only very specialized experts to be
able to judge these implementations. Two of the most prominent
bugs of the widely spread cryptographic library OpenSSL1 – the
Heartbleed bug and Debian’s faulty implementation of the pseudo-
random number generator – remained undiscovered for more than
two years [25].
1https://www.openssl.org/
Inspired by Snowden’s reveals, the recent developments reignited
the interest in these kind of attacks. Bellare et al. named them al-
gorithm substitution attacks (ASA) and showed several attacks on
certain symmetric encryption schemes [7]. Note that they defined
a very weak model, where the only goal of the attacker was to dis-
tinguish between two ciphertexts, but mostly used a stronger sce-
nario with the aim to recover the encryption key. Degabriele et al.
criticized the model of [7] by pointing out the results crucially rely
on the fact that a subverted encryption algorithm always needs
to produce valid ciphertexts (the decryptability assumption) and
proposed a refined security notion [13]. The model of algorithm
substitution attacks introduced in [7] was extended to signature
schemes by Ateniese et al. in [2]. Simultaneously, Bellare et al. [6]
strengthened the result of [7] by enforcing that the attack needs to
be stateless.
In this paper we thoroughly analyze (general) ASAs from the
steganographic point of view. The principle goal of steganogra-
phy is to hide information in unsuspicious communication such
that no observer can distinguish between normal documents and
documents that carry additional information. Modern steganogra-
phy was first made popular due to the prisoners’ problem by Sim-
mons [27] but, interestingly, the model was inspired by detecting
the risk of ASAs during development of the SALT2 treaty between
the Soviet Union and the United States in the late seventies [28].
This sheds some light on the inherent relationship between these
two frameworks which is well known in the literature (see e. g.
[23, 29, 30]). A related result showing that so called decoy pass-
word vaults are very closely related to stegosystems on a certain
kind of channels was presented by Pasquini et al. in [20].
Ourmain achievement is providing a strict relationship between
secure algorithm substitution attacks and the common computa-
tional model for secret-key steganography. Particularly, we prove
that successful ASAs correspond to secure stegosystems on certain
channels and vice versa. This formal proof allows us to conclude
that ASAs are stegosystems and to “rediscover” results of [2, 6, 7]
concerning ASAs.
The computational model for steganography used in this paper
was first presented by Hopper, Langford, and von Ahn [15, 16]
and independently proposed by Katzenbeisser and Petitcolas [18].
A stegosystem consists of an encoder and a decoder sharing a key.
The encoder’s goal is to embed a secret message into a sequence of
documents which are send via a public communication channel C
monitored by an adversary (often called thewarden due to the pris-
oners problem of Simmons [27]). The warden wants to distinguish
documents that carry no secret information from those sent by the
encoder. If all polynomial-time (in the security parameter κ) war-
dens fail to distinguish these cases, we say that the stegosystem is
secure. If the decoder is able to reconstruct the secret message from
the sequence send by the encoder, the system is called reliable.
Our Results
Wefirst investigate algorithm substitution attacks against symmet-
ric encryption schemes in the framework by Bellare et al. [6]. We
model encryption schemes as steganographic channels in appro-
priate way which allows to relate algorithm substitution attacks
with steganographic systems and vice versa. This leads to the fol-
lowing result.
Theorem 1.1 (Informal). Assume that SES is a symmetric en-
cryption scheme. Then there exists an indistinguishable and reliable
algorithm substitution attack against SES if and only if there exists
a secure and reliable stegosystem on the channel determined by SES.
The proof of the theorem is constructive in the sense that we
give an explicit construction of an algorithm substitution attack
against SES from a stegosystem and vice versa. As conclusion we
provide a generic ASA against every symmetric encryption scheme
SES whose insecurity is negligible if, roughly speaking, SES has
sufficiently largemin-entropy. Our algorithm against SES achieves
almost the same performance as the construction of Bellare et al.
(see Theorem 4.1 and Theorem 4.2 in [6] and also our discussion
in Section 6).
Next, we generalize our construction and show a generic algo-
rithm substitution attack ASA against any (polynomial-time) ran-
domized algorithm R which, with hardwired secret s , takes inputs
x and generates outputs y. Algorithm ASA, using a hidden hard-
wired randomkey ak, returns upon the secret s the sequence y˜1, y˜2, . . .
such that the output is indistinguishable from R(s,x1),R(s,x2), . . .
and y˜1, y˜2, . . . embeds the secret s . From this result we conclude:
Theorem 1.2 (Informal). There exists a generic algorithm sub-
stitution attack ASA that allows an undetectable subversion of any
cryptographic primitive of sufficiently large min-entropy.
Theorem 1.3 (Informal). Let Π be a cryptographic primitive
consisting with algorithms (Π.A1,Π.A2, . . . , Π.Ar ) such that {Ai |
i ∈ I } for some I ⊆ {1, . . . , r } are deterministic. Then there is no
ASA on Π which subverts only algorithms {Ai | i ∈ I }.
As a corollary we obtain the result of Ateniese et al. (Theorem 1
in [2]) that for every coin-injective signature scheme, there is a suc-
cessful algorithm substitution attack of negligible insecurity. More-
over we get (Theorem 2 in [2]) that for every coin-extractable sig-
nature scheme, there is a successful and secure ASA. We can con-
clude also (Theorem 3 in [2]) that unique signature schemes are re-
sistant to ASAs fulfilling the verifiability condition. Roughly speak-
ing the last property means that each message has exactly one sig-
nature and the ASA can only produce valid signatures.
We furthermore introduce the concept of universal ASAs that
can be used without a detailed description of the implementation
of the underlying cryptographic primitive and note that almost all
known ASAs belong to this class. Based upon this definition, we
prove the following upper bound on the information that can be
embedded into a single ciphertext:
Theorem 1.4 (Informal). No universal ASA is able to embed
more than O(1) · log(κ) bits of information into a single ciphertext.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains the ba-
sic preliminaries and notations that we use throughout this work,
Section 3 presents the formal definitions of algorithm substitution
attacks, and Section 4 gives the necessary background on steganog-
raphy. In order to relate ASAs and steganography, we make use of
an appropriate channel for symmetric encryption schemes defined
in Section 5. The proof of Theorem 1.1 is given in Section 6, where
one direction is contained in Theorem 6.1 and the other direction
is given as Theorem 6.3. We generalize our results to arbitrary ran-
domized algorithms in Section 7. Combining the positive results
of Theorem 7.1 with the generic stegosystem provided by Theo-
rem 4.1 allows us to conclude Theorem 1.2. The negative results of
Theorem 7.2 directly give Theorem 1.3. Finally, Section 8 defines
universal ASAs and contains the upper bound on the transmission
rate of these ASAs via a sequence of lemmata that results in Corol-
lary 8.4 implying Theorem 1.4.
2 BASIC PRELIMINARIES AND NOTATIONS
We use the following standard notations. A function f : N→ N is
negligible, if for all c ∈ N, there is an n0 ∈ N such that f (n) < n
−c
for all n ≥ n0. The set of all strings of length n on an alphabet Σ is
denoted by Σn and the set of all strings of length at most n is de-
noted by Σ≤n := ∪ni=0Σ
i . If S is a set, x ← S denotes the uniform
random assignment of an element of S to x . If A is a randomized
algorithm, x ← A denotes the random assignment (with regard to
the internal randomness of A) of the output of A to x . The min-
entropy measures the amount of randomness of a probability dis-
tributionD and is defined asH∞(D) = infx ∈supp(D){− log PrD (x)},
where supp(D) is the support of D. Moreover, PPTM stands for
probabilistic polynomial-time Turing machine.
A symmetric encryption scheme SES is a triple of probabilistic
polynomial-time algorithms (SES.Gen, SES.Enc, SES.Dec)with pa-
rameters SES.ml(κ) describing the length of the encryptedmessage
and SES.cl(κ) describing the length of a generated cipher message.
The algorithms have the following properties:
• The key generator SES.Gen produces upon input 1κ a key
k with |k | = κ .
• The encryption algorithm SES.Enc takes as input the key k
and a messagem ∈ {0, 1}SES.ml(κ) of length SES.ml(κ) and
produces a ciphertext c ∈ {0, 1}SES.cl(κ) of length SES.cl(κ).
• The decryption algorithm SES.Dec takes as input the key k
and a ciphertext c ∈ {0, 1}SES.cl(κ) and produces amessage
m′ ∈ {0, 1}SES.ml(κ).
If the context is clear, we also write Gen, Enc, Dec, ml and cl
without the prefix SES. We say that (Gen, Enc,Dec) is reliable, if
Dec(k, Enc(k,m)) =m for all k and allm.
An cpa-attacker A against a symmetric encryption scheme is
a PPTM that mounts chosen-plaintext-attacks (cpa): It is given a
challenging oracle CH that either equals Enck for a randomly gen-
erated key k or produces random bitstrings of length cl(κ). For
an integer λ, let RAND(λ) be an algorithm that returns uniformly
distributed bitstrings of length λ. The goal of A is to distinguish
between those settings. Formally, this is defined via the following
experiment named CPA-Dist:
CPA-DistA,SES(κ)
Parties: attacker A, symmetric encryption scheme SES =
(Gen, Enc,Dec)
1: k ← Gen(1κ ); b ← {0, 1}
2: b ′ ← ACH(1κ )
3: return b = b ′
oracle CH(m)
1: if b = 0 then return Enc(k,m)
else return RAND(cl(κ))
Algorithm 1: Chosen-Plaintext-Attack experiment with se-
curity parameter κ.
A symmetric encryption scheme SES is cpa-secure if for every
attacker A there is a negligible function negl such that
Adv
cpa
SES
(κ) := | Pr[CPA-DistA,SES(κ) = true] − 1/2| ≤ negl(κ).
The maximal advantage of any attacker against SES is called the
insecurity of SES and is defined as
InSec
cpa
SES
(κ) := max
A
{Adv
cpa
A,SES
(κ)}.
For a SES = (Gen, Enc,Dec) we will assume that it has non-
trivial randomization measured by the min-entropy H∞(SES) of
ciphertexts that is defined via
2−H∞(SES) = max
k,m,c
Pr[SES.Enc(k,m) = c].
For two numbers ℓ, ℓ′ ∈ N, denote the set of all function from
{0, 1}ℓ to {0, 1}ℓ
′
by Fun(ℓ, ℓ′). Clearly, in order to specify a ran-
dom element of Fun(ℓ, ℓ′), one needs 2ℓ × ℓ′ bits and we can thus
not use completely random functions in an efficient setting. There-
fore we will use efficient functions that are indistinguishable from
completely random functions. A pseudorandom function is a pair
of PPTMs F = (F.Eval, F.Gen) such that F.Gen upon input 1κ pro-
duces a key k ∈ {0, 1}κ . The keyed function F.Eval takes the key
k ← F.Gen(1κ ) and a bitstring x of length F.in(κ) and produces
a string F.Evalk (x) of length F.out(κ). An attacker, called distin-
guisher Dist, is a PPTM that upon input 1κ gets oracle access to
a function that either equals F.Evalk for a randomly chosen key k
or is a completely random function f . The goal of Dist is to distin-
guish between those cases. A pseudorandom function F is secure
if for every distinguisher Dist there is a negligible function negl
such that
Adv
prf
Dist,F
(κ) :=
Pr[DistF.Evalk (1κ ) = 1] − Pr[Distf (1κ ) = 1]
 ≤ negl(κ),
where k ← F.Gen(1κ ) and f ← Fun(F.in(κ), F.out(κ)). If Dist
outputs 1, this means that the distinguisher Dist believes that he
deals with a truly random function.
As usual, the maximal advantage of any distinguisher against F
is called the prf-insecurity InSec
prf
F
(κ) and defined as
InSec
prf
F
(κ) := max
Dist
{Adv
prf
Dist,F
(κ)}.
3 ALGORITHM SUBSTITUTION ATTACKS
AGAINST ENCRYPTION SCHEMES
While it is certainly very useful for an attacker to be able to recon-
struct the key, one can also consider situations, where the extractor
should be able to extract different information from the ciphertexts
or signatures. We will thus generalize the algorithm substitution
attacks described in the literature to the setting, where the sub-
stituted algorithm also takes a message am as argument and the
goal of the extractor is to derive this message from the produced
ciphertext. By always setting am := k , this is the setting described
by Bellare et al. in [6]. We thus strengthen the model of [7] and [6]
in this sense.
Below we give in detail our definitions based upon the model
proposed by Bellare et al. in [6]. If the substitution attack is state-
ful, we allow the distinguisher that tries to identify the attack to
also choose this state and observe the internal state of the attack.
Every algorithm substitution attack thus needs to be stateless, as
in the model of Bellare et al. in [6]. Note that this is a stronger re-
quirement than in [7] and [2], as those works also allowed stateful
attacks.
In our setting an algorithm substitution attack against a sym-
metric encryption scheme SES = (SES.Gen, SES.Enc, SES.Dec) is
a triple of PPTMs
ASA = (ASA.Gen,ASA.Enc,ASA.Ext)
with parameter ASA.ml(κ) for the message length – the length of
the attacker message – and the following functionality.
• The key generator ASA.Gen produces upon input 1κ an
attacker key ak of length κ .
• The encryption algorithm ASA.Enc takes an attacker key
ak ∈ supp(ASA.Gen(1κ )), attacker message am such that
am ∈ {0, 1}ASA.ml(κ), an encryption keyk ∈ supp(SES.Gen
(1κ )), an encryption message m ∈ {0, 1}SES.ml(κ), and a
state σ ∈ {0, 1}∗ and produces a ciphertext c of length
SES.cl(κ) and a new state σ ′.
• The extraction algorithmASA.Ext takes as input an attacker
key ak ∈ supp(ASA.Gen(1κ )) and ℓ = ASA.ol(κ) a cipher-
text c1, . . . , cℓ with ci ∈ {0, 1}
SES.cl(κ) and produces an
attacker message am′.
An algorithm substitution attack needs (a) to be indistinguish-
able from the symmetric encryption scheme and (b) should be able
to reliably extract the message am of length ASA.ml(κ) from the
ciphertexts. Due to information-theoretic reasons, it might be im-
possible to embed the attacker message am into a single ciphertext:
If SES.Enc uses 10 bits of randomness, at most 10 bits from am can
be reliably embedded into a ciphertext. Hence, the algorithm sub-
stitution attack needs to produce more than one ciphertext in this
case. For message m1, . . . ,mℓ , the complete output, denoted as
ASA.Encℓ (ak, am,k,m1, . . . ,mℓ) is defined as follows:
1: σ = ∅
2: for j = 1 to ℓ do (cj ,σ ) ← ASA.Enc(ak, am,k,m j ,σ )
3: return c1, . . . , cℓ
To formally define the probability that the extractor is able to
reliably extract am from the given ciphertexts c1, . . . , cℓ , we de-
fine its reliability2 as 1 − UnRelASA,SES(κ), where the unreliability
UnRelASA,SES is given as
max{Pr[ASA.Ext(ak,ASA.Encℓ (ak, am,k,m1, . . . ,mℓ)) , am]},
with the maximum taken over all ak ∈ supp(ASA.Gen(1κ )), am ∈
{0, 1}ASA.ml(κ), andmi ∈ {0, 1}
SES.ml(κ). The algorithm is success-
ful, if there is negligible function negl with UnRelASA,SES(κ) ≤
negl(κ).
The indistinguishability of an ASA is defined as follows. Call
a watchdog Watch a PPTM that tries to distinguish the output of
the attacker encryption algorithm ASA.Enc from the original en-
cryption algorithm Enc. The indistinguishability is defined via the
game named ASA-Dist:
ASA-DistWatch,ASA,SES(κ)
Parties: watchdog Watch, algorithm substitution attack
ASA = (ASA.Gen,ASA.Enc, ASA.Ext), and encryp-
tion scheme SES = (SES.Gen, SES.Enc, SES.Dec)
1: ak ← ASA.Gen(1κ ); b ← {0, 1}
2: b ′ ← WatchCH(1κ )
3: return b = b ′
oracle CH(am,k,m,σ )
1: if b = 0 then c ← SES.Enc(k,m)
else (c,σ ) ← ASA.Enc(ak, am,k,m,σ )
2: return (c,σ )
Algorithm 2: ASA-distinguishing (detection) experiment
with security parameter κ.
An algorithm substitution attack ASA is called indistinguishable
from the symmetric encryption scheme SES, if for every watchdog
Watch, there is a negligible function negl such that
Adv
enc-watch
Watch,ASA,SES
(κ) :=
| Pr[ASA-DistWatch,ASA,SES(κ) = true] − 1/2| ≤ negl(κ).
The maximal advantage of any watchdog distinguishing ASA
from SES is called the indistinguishability or insecurity of ASA and
is defined as
InSec
enc-watch
ASA,SES (κ) := max
Watch
{Advenc-watch
Watch,ASA,SES
(κ)}.
In [7], Bellare et al. proposed a (stateless) constructionASA against
all symmetric encryption schemes SES. They prove in Theorem 3
that if SES is a randomized, stateless, coin-injective symmetric en-
cryption scheme with randomness-length r and if the ASA uses a
PRF F then for a watchdogWatch that makes q queries to its CH or-
aclewe can construct an adversaryA such thatAdvenc-watch
Watch,ASA,SES
(κ) ≤
q/22
r
+Adv
prf
A,F
(κ), where Amakes q oracle queries and its running
time is that ofWatch.
2In [6], this is called the key recovery security.
Bellare et al. conclude that as long as their scheme uses a non-
trivial amount of randomness, for example r ≥ 7 bits resulting
2r ≥ 128, Theorem 3 implies that the subversion is undetectable.
4 BACKGROUNDS OF STEGANOGRAPHY
The definitions of the basic steganography concepts presented in
this section are essentially those of [16] and [12].
In order to define undetectable hidden communication, we need
to introduce a notion of unsuspicious communication. We do this
via the notion of a channel C. A channel C on the alphabet Σ with
maximal document length C.n is a function that maps a string of
previously send elements h ∈ (Σ≤C.n )∗ – the history – to a prob-
ability distribution upon Σ≤C.n . We denote this probability distri-
bution by Ch . The elements of Σ
≤C.n are called documents. As
usually, we will assume that the sequences of documents are effi-
ciently prefix-free recognizable.
A stegosystem S on a family of channels C = {Cκ }κ∈N is a triple
of probabilistic polynomial-time (according to the security param-
eter κ) algorithms:
S = (S.Gen, S.Enc, S.Dec)
with parameters S.ml(κ) describing the message length of the sub-
liminal (hidden, or attacker) message and S.ol(κ) describing the
length of a generated sequence of stego documents to embed the
whole hidden message. The algorithms have the following func-
tionality:
• The key generator S.Gen takes the unary presentation of
an integer κ – the security parameter – and outputs a key
(we will call it an attacker key) ak ∈ {0, 1}κ of length κ .
• The stegoencoder S.Enc takes as input the key ak, the at-
tacker (or hidden) message am ∈ {0, 1}S.ml(κ), a history
h, and a state σ and outputs a document d from Cκ such
that am is (partially) embedded in this document and a
new state. In order to produce the document, S.Enc also
has sampling access to Cκ
h
. We denote this by writing
S.EncC(ak, am,h,σ ).
• The (history-ignorant) stegodecoder S.Dec takes as input
the key ak and ℓ = S.ol(κ) documents d1, . . . ,dℓ and out-
puts amessage am′. A history-ignorant stegodecoder thus
has no knowledge of previously sent documents. The stego-
decoders of nearly all known systems are history-ignorant.
To improve readability, if the stegosystem is clear from the con-
text, we will omit the prefix S. If C = {Cκ }κ∈N is a family of
channels, the min-entropy of H∞(C,κ) is defined as H∞(C,κ) =
minh∈Σ∗ {H∞(C
κ
h
)}. In order to be useful, the stegodecoder should
reliably decode the embedded message from the sequence of docu-
ments. As in the setting of algorithm substitution attack, the com-
plete output of ℓ documents of the stegosystem for the history
h on the subliminal message am of length S.ml(κ) is denoted as
S.Encℓ,C(ak, am,h) and is defined as follows.
1: σ = ∅
2: for j = 1 to ℓ do
3: (d j ,σ ) ← S.Enc
C(ak, am,h,σ ); h = h | | d j
4: return d1, . . . ,dℓ
The unreliability UnRelS,C(κ) of the stegosystem S on the chan-
nel family {Cκ }κ∈N with security parameter κ is defined as
UnRelS,C(κ) :=
max
ak,am
max
h
{Pr[S.Dec(ak, S.Encℓ,C(ak, am,h)) , am]},
where the maximum is taken over all ak ∈ supp(S.Gen(1κ )), am ∈
{0, 1}S.ml(κ), and h ∈ (Σn(κ))∗. If there is a negligible function negl
such that UnRelS,C(κ) ≤ negl(κ), we say that S is reliable on C.
Furthermore, the reboot-reliability of the stegosystem S is defined
as
UnRel
⋆
S,C(κ) :=
max
ak,am
max
τ
max
h1, ...,hτ
max
ℓ1, ..., ℓτ
{Pr[S.Dec(ak,d1,d2, . . . ,dℓ) , am]}
where the maxima are taken over all ak ∈ supp(S.Gen(1κ )), am ∈
{0, 1}S.ml(κ), all positive integers τ ≤ ℓ, all histories h1, . . . ,hτ ,
and all positive integers ℓ1, . . . , ℓτ such that ℓ1 + . . . + ℓτ = ℓ. The
documents d1, . . . ,dℓ are the concatenated output of the runs
S.Encℓ1,C(ak, am,h1) | | . . . | | S.Enc
ℓτ ,C(ak, am,hτ ).
We say that the stegosystem S is reboot-reliable if UnRel⋆
S,C
(κ) is
bounded from above by a negligible function. This corresponds
to a situation where the stegoencoder is restarted τ times, each
time with the history hi , and is allowed to generate ℓi documents.
Note that reboot-reliability is a strictly stronger requirement than
reliability and we can thus conclude
UnRelS,C(κ) ≤ UnRel
⋆
S,C(κ).
To define the security of a stegosystem, we first specify the abil-
ities of an attacker: A warden Ward is a probabilistic polynomial-
time algorithm that will have access to a challenge oracle CH. This
challenge oracle can be called with a message am and a history h
and is either equal to S.EncC (ak, am,h,σ ) for a key ak ← S.Gen(1κ )
or equal to random documents of the channel.
The goal of the warden is to distinguish between those oracles.
It also has access to samples of the channel Cκ
h
for a freely cho-
sen history h. Formally, the chosen-hiddentext-attack-advantage is
defined via the following game SS-CHA-Dist:
SS-CHA-DistWard,S,C(κ)
Parties: warden Ward, stegosystem S, channel C
1: ak ← S.Gen(1κ )
2: b ← {0, 1}
3: b ′ ← WardCH,C(1κ )
4: return b = b ′
oracle CH(am,h,σ )
1: if b = 0 then d ← Cκ
h
else (d,σ ) ← S.Enc(ak, am,h,σ )
2: return (d,σ )
Algorithm 3: Chosen-Hiddentext experiment with security
parameter κ.
A stegosystem S is called secure against chosen-hiddentext at-
tacks if for every warden Ward, there is a negligible function negl
such that
Adv
cha
Ward,S,C
(κ) := | Pr[SS-CHA-DistWard,S,C(κ) = true] − 1/2|
≤ negl(κ).
Themaximal advantage of anywarden against S is the insecurity
InSec
cha
S,C
(κ) and defined as maxWard{Adv
cha
Ward,S,C
(κ)}.
A very common technique in the design of secure stegosystems
called rejection sampling goes back to an idea of Anderson, pre-
sented in [1]. The basic concept is that the stegoencoder samples
from the channel until he finds a document that already encodes
the hiddentext. This was first used by Cachin in [10] to construct
a secure stegosystem in the information-theoretic sense.
In the following, let F be pseudorandom function that maps
input strings of length F.in(κ) (documents) to strings of length
F.out(κ) = log(ml(κ)) + 1 (message parts). To simplify notation,
we treat the output of F.Evalk as a pair (b, j) with |b | = 1 and
|j | = log(ml(κ)). The encoder of the rejection sampling stegosystem,
which we denote as RejSamF, is defined as follows:
RejSamF.Enc(ak, am,h,σ )
Input: key ak, message am, history h, state σ
1: i := 0;
2: repeat
3: d ← Ch
4: i := i + 1
5: (b, j) := F.Evalak(d)
6: until am[j] = b or i > s ⊲ am[j] is the j-th bit of am
7: return (d,σ )
Algorithm 4: Stegoencoder of RejSam with security parame-
ter κ and s ≥ 1.
The key generator RejSamF.Gen is equal to F.Gen and the de-
coder derives am, as long as its input documents contain every bit
am[j], by applying F.Evalak to these documents. Below we present
the description of the decoder. Note that the stegosystem is state-
less.
RejSamF.Dec(ak,d1, . . . ,dS.ol(κ))
Input: key ak, documents d1, . . . ,dS.ol(κ)
1: for j = 1, . . . ,ml(κ) do
2: let amj := ⊥
3: for i = 1, 2, . . . , S.ol(κ) do
4: (b, j) := F.Evalk (di )
5: let amj := b
6: if all amj , ⊥ then
7: return am = am1am2 . . . amml(κ)
8: else
9: return ⊥
Algorithm 5: Decoder of RejSam.
In [16], Hopper et al. were the first to prove the security of this
stegosystem in the complexity-theoretic model. Their argument
was simplified by Dedić et al. in [12] and by Backes and Cachin in
[3]. The version given here is based upon the stateless construction
of Dedić et al. and also uses the idea of Bellare et al. in [6] to apply
the coupon collector’s problem to completely get rid of the state by
randomly choosing an index to embed.
The analysis of the coupon collector’s problem shows that by
sendingml(κ) · (lnml(κ)+β) documents – for an appropriate value
β – one only introduces a term exp(−β) into the unreliability (see
e. g. [19] for a proof of this fact), which can be made negligible by
setting β ≥ ml(κ) − ln(ml(κ)). The output length on messages of
length ml(κ) will thus be bounded by ml(κ)2.
The security of this system directly follows from the analysis of
Dedić et al. in [12]:
Theorem 4.1 ([12, Theorems 4 and 5]). For every polynomial
ml(κ), there exists a universal history-ignorant stegosystem S = RejSamF
with security parameter κ and s ≥ 1 such that for every channel Cκ
we have
• S.ml(κ) = ml(κ),
• InSeccha
S,C
(κ) ≤ O(ml(κ)4 · 2−H∞(C
κ )
+ml(κ)2 · exp(−s)) +
InSec
prf
F,C
(κ), and
• UnRel⋆
S,C
(κ) ≤ ml(κ)2(2·exp(−2H∞(C
κ )−3)+exp(−2−2s))+
InSec
prf
F,C
(κ).
The notation InSec
prf
F,C
(κ) indicates the insecurity of the pseudo-
random function F relative to the channel C. Informally, this means
that the attacker against F also has sampling access to C (for a for-
mal definition, see [12]). For an efficiently sampleable channel C
(i. e. one that can be simulated by a PPTM), it clearly holds that
InSec
prf
F,C
(κ) = InSec
prf
F
(κ). All channels used in this work are ef-
ficiently sampleable and we will thus omit the index C from the
term InSec.
5 ENCRYPTION SCHEMES AS
STEGANOGRAPHIC CHANNELS
Let SES = (Gen, Enc,Dec) be a symmetric encryption scheme that
encodesmessages of lengthml(κ) into ciphertexts of length cl(κ) ≥
ml(κ) and let ℓ be a polynomial of κ . For SES we define a channel
family, named Cκ
SES
(ℓ), indexed with parameter κ ∈ N, where the
documents will correspond to the input of generalized algorithm
substitution attack against encryption schemes. The essential idea
behind the definition of the channel Cκ
SES
(ℓ) is that for all k ∈
supp(Gen(1κ )) and every sequence of messagesm1,m2, . . . ,mℓ(κ),
withmi ∈ {0, 1}
ml(κ), for the history
h = k | | m1 | | m2 | | . . . | | mℓ(κ)
the distribution of the sequences of documents
c1 | | c2 | | . . . | | cℓ(κ)
generated by the channel is exactly the same as the distribution for
Enc(k,m1) | | Enc(k,m2) | | . . . | | Enc(k,mℓ(κ)).
To give a formal definition of {Cκ
SES
(ℓ)}κ∈N we need to specify the
probability distributions for any history h. Thus, we define the
family, on the alphabet {0, 1}, as follows.
For the empty history h = ∅, define
CκSES(ℓ)∅
as the distribution of all keys generated by Gen(1κ ). For a key
k ∈ supp(Gen(1κ )) and a (possibly empty) sequence of messages
m1,m2, . . . ,mr , with mi ∈ {0, 1}
ml(κ) and 0 ≤ r ≤ ℓ(κ) − 1, the
distribution
CκSES(ℓ)k | |m1 | |m2 | |... | |mr
is the uniform distribution on all messages mr+1 ∈ {0, 1}
ml(κ).
For k ∈ supp(Gen(1κ )), a sequence of messagesm1,m2, . . . ,mℓ(κ)
withmi ∈ {0, 1}
ml(κ), and a (possibly empty) sequence of cipher-
texts c1, . . . , cr , with ci ∈ supp(Enc(k,m((i−1) mod ℓ(κ))+1)), the dis-
tribution
CκSES(ℓ)k | |m1 | |m2 | |... | |mℓ(κ ) | |c1 | |c2 | |... | |... | |cr
is the distribution of Enc(k,m(r mod ℓ(κ))+1).
6 ASAS AGAINST ENCRYPTION IN THE
STEGANOGRAPHIC MODEL
The main message of our paper is that algorithm substitution at-
tacks against a primitive Π are equivalent to the use of steganogra-
phy on a corresponding channel CΠ determined by the protocol Π.
Focusing on symmetric encryption schemes as a common crypto-
graphic primitive, we will show in this section exemplary proofs
for the general relations between ASAs and steganography.
In the previous section we showed a formal specification of the
family of communication channels Cκ
SES
(ℓ) determined by a sym-
metric encryption scheme SES. We will now prove that a secure
and reliable stegosystem on Cκ
SES
(ℓ) implies the existence of an
indistinguishable and successful algorithm substitution attack on
SES. On the other hand, we will also show that the existence of an
indistinguishable and successful algorithm substitution attack on
SES implies a secure and reliable stegosystem on Cκ
SES
(ℓ).
As a consequence we get a construction of an ASA against any
encryption scheme using a generic stegosystem like e. g. this pro-
posed by Dedić et al. [12]. Thus, we can conclude Theorem 1 and
Theorem 3 proposed by Bellare et al. in [7] that there exist indistin-
guishable and successful ASAs against encryption schemes. More-
over we obtain Theorem 4 in [7] which says that an ASA is impos-
sible for unique ciphertext symmetric encryption schemes.
6.1 Steganography implies ASAs
Theorem 6.1. Assume SES is a symmetric encryption scheme and
let S be a stegosystem on the channel C := Cκ
SES
(S.ol(κ)) deter-
mined by SES. Then there exists an algorithm substitution attack
ASA against SES of indistinguishability, resp. reliability such that:
InSec
enc-watch
ASA,SES
(κ) ≤ InSeccha
S,C
(κ) and
UnRelASA,SES(κ) = UnRel
⋆
S,C
(κ).
Proof. Let SES = (Gen, Enc,Dec) be a symmetric encryption
scheme and S = (SGen, SEnc, SDec) be a stegosystem on the chan-
nel C. To simplify notation, let ℓ = ℓ(κ) := S.ol(κ). We will con-
struct the algorithm substitution attackASA = (AGen,AEnc,AExt)
on SES from the stegosystem S and show the indistinguishability
and success of ASA depending on security and reliability of S. The
components of the ASA are defined as follows.
The key generator AGen just simulates SGen – the key gen-
erator of the stegosystem. It will output the attack key ak. The
encoding algorithm AEnc on input ak ∈ supp(AGen(1κ )), am ∈
{0, 1}S.ml(κ), k ∈ supp(Gen(1κ )), and m ∈ {0, 1}SES.ml(κ) simu-
lates SEnc on channel C with input key ak, the message am and
the history h = k | | mℓ , where mℓ is the string of length ℓ · |m |
containing ℓ copies of m. Whenever SEnc makes a query to its
channel oracle, algorithm AEnc uses Enc on input k andm to pro-
duce a corresponding ciphertext and sends it to SEnc. The encoder
AEnc then outputs the document d generated by SEnc. Finally, the
extraction algorithm AExt on input ak ∈ supp(AGen(1κ )) and doc-
uments d1, . . . ,dℓ just simulates SDec on the same inputs.
As one can see from the definitions, ASA is a generalized algo-
rithm substitution attack against SES. We will now prove that it is
indistinguishable from SES and that it is successful.
We prove first indistinguishability of the system. Let Watch be
a watchdog against the above ASA with maximal advantage, i. e.
Adv
enc-watch
Watch,ASA,SES
(κ) = InSecenc-watchASA,SES (κ),
where Advenc-watch
Watch,ASA,SES
(κ) is equal to the success probability that
ASA-DistWatch,ASA,SES(κ) = true. We will now construct a warden
Ward fromWatch such that
Adv
cha
Ward,S,C
(κ) = Advenc-watch
Watch,ASA,SES
(κ).
Thus, we will get that
InSec
enc-watch
ASA,SES (κ) ≤ InSec
cha
S,C(κ). (1)
The wardenWard on input 1κ just simulates the watchdogWatch
and gives the same output as Watch at the end of the simulation.
Whenever the watchdog makes a query on input am, k , and m
to its challenging oracle (that is either equal to SES’s encryption
algorithm Enc(k,m) or to ASA’s encryption AEnc(ak, am,k,m,σ )
for ak ← AGen(1κ )), the wardenWard queries its own challenging
oracle with message am, state σ and history h = k | | mℓ . Note that
the challenging oracle of Ward is either equal to the channel C or
to SEnc(ak, am,h,σ ) for ak ← SGen(1κ ).
If the challenging oracle ofWard is equal to the steganographic
encoding SEnc(ak, am,h,σ ) (i. e. the bit b in SS-CHA-Dist equals 1,
denoted by SS-CHA-DistWard,S,C(κ)〈b = 1〉), the answer of Ward
is the same as the output of theWatch in case it queries the ASA’s
encoding algorithm AEnc(ak, am,k,m) by construction. Thus,
Pr[SS-CHA-DistWard,S,C(κ)〈b = 1〉 = true]
= Pr[ASA-DistWatch,ASA,SES(κ)〈b = 1〉 = true].
If the challenging oracle of Ward is equal to the channel (the
bit b in SS-CHA-Dist equals 0), by the definition of the channel
C for the symmetric encryption scheme SES, the answer of the
challenging oracle is equal to the output of Enc(k,m). Hence,
Pr[SS-CHA-DistWard,S,C(κ)〈b = 0〉 = true]
= Pr[ASA-DistWatch,ASA,SES(κ)〈b = 0〉 = true].
We thus have
Adv
cha
Ward,S,C
(κ) = | Pr[SS-CHA-DistWard,S,C(κ) = true] − 1/2|
= | Pr[ASA-DistWatch,ASA,SES(κ) = true − 1/2|
= Adv
enc-watch
Watch,ASA,SES
(κ)
which completes the proof of (1).
We still need to prove that AExt is reliably able to extract the
attacker message am from the ciphertext. But, as AExt = SDec, the
reboot-reliability of SDec directly implies that AExt is successful
with probability of 1 − negl(κ). 
By combining Theorem 6.1 and Theorem 4.1, we can conclude
the following corollary.
Corollary 6.2. For every symmetric encryption scheme SES, there
exists an algorithm subsection attack ASAwith message lengthml(κ)
and parameter s ≥ 1 such that
InSec
enc-watch
ASA,SES
(κ) ≤ O(ml(κ)4 · 2−H∞(C
κ ))+
O(ml(κ)2 · exp(−s)) + InSec
prf
F
(κ),
UnRel
⋆
S,C
(κ) ≤ 2ml(κ)2 · exp(−2H∞(C
κ )−3)+
ml(κ)2 · exp(−2−2s) + InSec
prf
F
(κ)
where C := Cκ
SES
(S.ol(κ))
One can compare this corollary to the construction used in the
proof of Theorem 4.1 and Theorem 4.2 in [6]. We can see that our
generic algorithm substitution attack gets almost the same bounds
for insecurity and for unreliability.
Note that the protocols in [2, 6] and our generic protocol of
Corollary 6.2 have a very bad rate: ml
ml ·(lnml+β )
= 1/(lnml+β) for
an appropriate value β . One can easily modify the above construc-
tions such that instead of one bit b of a message am we embed
a block of log(ml) bits per ciphertext. This improves the rate to
logml
ln(ml)−ln log(ml)+β
= Θ(1).
6.2 ASAs imply Steganography
Theorem 6.3. Assume SES is a symmetric encryption scheme and
let ASA be an algorithm substitution attack against SES of output
length ASA.ol(κ). Then there exists a stegosystem S with the output
length S.ol(κ) = 2 ·ASA.ol(κ)+ 1 on the channel C := Cκ
SES
(S.ol(κ))
determined by SES such that S’s insecurity, resp. its reliability satisfy
InSec
cha
S,C
(κ) ≤ InSecenc-watch
ASA,SES
(κ) and
UnRelS,C(κ) = UnRelASA,SES(κ).
Proof. Let SES = (Gen, Enc,Dec) be a symmetric encryption
scheme and ASA = (AGen,AEnc,AExt) be an algorithm substitu-
tion attack against SES. To simplify notation, let ℓ = ASA.ol(κ).
We construct the stegosystem S = (SGen, SEnc, SDec) on C out of
the ASA.
The key generation algorithm SGen simply simulates AGen. It
will output the key ak. To encode a message am using the key
ak, the stegoencoding algorithm SEnc generates for any history
h a sequence of S.ol(κ) = 2ℓ + 1 documents such that the last ℓ
documents embed the message am. To describe the algorithm we
need to distinguish between different given histories h.
h = ∅: In this case, SEnc chooses a random key k ← SES.Gen(1κ )
using the generation algorithm of SES and outputs k .
h = k | | m1 | | m2 | | . . . | | mr for 0 ≤ r ≤ ℓ − 1: Encoder SEnc sam-
ples a random messagemr+1 and outputs it.
h = k | | m1 | | m2 | | . . . | | mℓ | | c1 | | . . . | | cr with r ≥ 0: The stego-
encoder SEnc simulatesAEnc(ak, am,k,m(r+1) mod ℓ+1) and
outputs the generated ciphertext.
Note that by construction, in any case the last ℓ documents gen-
erated by SEnc2ℓ+1 embed the message am in the same way as
done by ASAℓ .
If the decoder SDec is given documentsd1, . . . ,d2ℓ+1, we output
AExt(ak,dℓ+2, . . . ,d2ℓ+1).
As one can see from the definitions, the decoding algorithm
of S is history-ignorant. We will prove that on the channel C =
Cκ
SES
(2ℓ + 1) the security and reliability of the stegosystem S sat-
isfy the stated conditions.
We first analyze the security of the system. Let Ward be a war-
den against S on C with maximal advantage, i. e.
Adv
cha
Ward,S,C
(κ) = InSecchaS,C(κ),
where Advcha
Ward,S,C
(κ) = Pr[SS-CHA-DistWard,S,C(κ) = true]. We
will construct a watchdog Watch against the algorithm substitu-
tion attack ASA with the same advantage as Ward:
Adv
enc-watch
Watch,ASA,SES
(κ) = Advcha
Ward,S,C
(κ).
This will prove that
InSec
cha
S,C(κ) ≤ InSec
enc-watch
ASA,SES (κ). (2)
The watchdogWatch on input 1κ simply simulates the warden
Ward. Whenever the warden Ward makes a query to its channel
oracle Cwith a historyh, the watchdogWatch simulates the oracle
response as follows:
• If h = ∅, the watchdog uses Gen(1κ ) to construct a key k
and returns k to the warden.
• If h = k | | m1 | | . . . | | mr with r < ℓ, the watchdog uni-
formly chooses a message mr+1 from {0, 1}
SES.ml(κ) and
outputsmr+1.
• If h = k | | m1 | | . . . | | mℓ | | c1 | | . . . | | cr with r ≥ 0, the
watchdog computes cr+1 ← Enc(k,m((r+1) mod ℓ)+1) and
outputs cr+1.
Clearly, this simulates the channel distribution C perfectly. If the
warden queries its challenge oracleWard.CHwith chosenmessage
am, state σ , and history h (that is either equivalent to sampling
from Ch or to calling SEnc(ak, am,h,σ )), the watchdog simulates
the response of the oracleWard.CH as follows:
• If h = ∅ thenWatch chooses a random key k ← Gen(1κ )
and outputs it.
• If h = k | | m1 | | m2 | | . . . | | mr for 0 ≤ r ≤ ℓ − 1 then
Watch samples a random messagem and outputs it.
• If h = k | | m1 | | m2 | | . . . | | mℓ | | c1 | | . . . | | cr
with r ≥ 0 then Watch queries its own oracle on k and
m((r+1) mod ℓ)+1.
If Watch.CH is equal to Enc of SES (the bit b in ASA-Dist is set to
0) the corresponding answer is identically distributed to a sample
of the channel C. Hence,
Pr[ASA-DistWatch,ASA,SES(κ)〈b = 0〉 = true] =
Pr[SS-CHA-DistWard,S,C(κ)〈b = 0〉 = true].
On the other hand, if Watch.CH is equal to AEnc (the bit b in
ASA-Dist is set to 1), the corresponding answer is identically dis-
tributed to SEnc(ak, am,h,σ ) and thus
Pr[ASA-DistWatch,ASA,SES(κ)〈b = 1〉 = true] =
Pr[SS-CHA-DistWard,S,C(κ)〈b = 1〉 = true].
We thus have
Adv
enc-watch
Watch,ASA,SES
(κ) =
| Pr[ASA-DistWatch,ASA,SES(κ) = true] − 1/2| =
| Pr[SS-CHA-DistWard,S,C(κ) = true] − 1/2| =
Adv
cha
Ward,S,C
(κ)
which proves (2).
The reliability of S is the same as the success probability of ASA
since SDec simply simulates AExt. 
By using the fact that channels with min-entropy 0 can not be
used for steganography (see e. g. Theorem 6 in [16]) and observing
that channels corresponding to deterministic encryption schemes
have min-entropy 0, we can conclude the following corollary:
Corollary 6.4. For all deterministic encryption schemes SES and
all algorithm substitution attacks ASA against SES:
InSec
enc-watch
ASA,SES (κ) ≥ 1.
Note that this exactly Theorem 4 in [7].
7 GENERAL RESULTS
Let R be a polynomial-time randomized algorithm with hardwired
secret s which takes inputs x and generates outputs y. The gen-
eral task of an algorithm substitution attack against R is to con-
struct a subverted algorithmARak which using a hidden hardwired
random key ak outputs on the secret s in the sequence of calls
ARak(s,x1),ARak(s,x2), . . . a sequence such that
(1) the outputARak(s,x1),ARak(s,x2), . . . is indistinguishable
from R(s,x1),R(s,x2), . . . and
(2) ARak(s,x1),ARak(s,x2), . . . embeds the secret s .
In our setting we model the attack on R as a stegosystem on a
channel determined by R and define such a channel.
7.1 ASA against a Randomized Algorithm
In this section we give formal definitions for algorithm substitu-
tion attack AR, its advantage AdvWatch,AR,R, etc. Formally, an al-
gorithm substitution attack against R is a triple of efficient algo-
rithms ASA = (Gen,AR, Ext), where Gen generates the key ak, the
algorithm AR takes the key ak, a secret s and all inputs x1,x2, . . .
to R and the extractor Ext tries to extract s from the outputs of
ARwith the help of ak (but without knowing x1,x2, . . .). Similarly
to the setting for encryption schemes, ASA is called indistinguish-
able, if every PPTM Watch – the watchdog – is not able to dis-
tinguish between ARak(s,x1),ARak(s,x2), . . . and R(x1),R(x2), . . .
even if he is allowed to choose s and all xi . This is defined via the
game RASA-DistWatch,ASA,R defined analogously toASA-Dist. The
maximal advantage of any watchdog distinguishing ASA from R is
called the insecurity or indistinguishability of ASA and is formally
defined as
InSec
asa
ASA,R(κ) := max
Watch
{Advasa
Watch,ASA,R
(κ)},
where
Adv
asa
Watch,ASA,R
(κ) :=
| Pr[RASA-DistWatch,ASA,R(κ) = true] − 1/2|.
The unreliability of ASA is also defined like before:
UnRelASA,R(κ) :=
max{Pr[ASA.AExt(ak,ASA.AR(ak, am,x1, . . . , xℓ)) , am]},
where the maximum is taken over all ak ∈ supp(ASA.Gen(1κ )),
am ∈ {0, 1}ASA.ml(κ), and x1, . . . ,xℓ being inputs to R.
Known examples which fit into this setting include e. g. the
subversion-resilient signature schemes presented in the work of
Ateniese et al. [2].
7.2 Channel determined by a Randomized
Algorithm
Let R be a polynomial-time randomized algorithm with parame-
ter κ . We assume that the secret s is generated by Gen and the
inputs x to R are generated by the randomized polynomial-time
algorithm GenInput, associated with R (which may be chosen ad-
versarially as shown in the definition above). Let ℓ be a polyno-
mial of κ . For R we define a channel family, named Cκ
R
(ℓ), indexed
with parameter κ ∈ N, with documents which correspond to the
input of AR. The essential idea behind the definition of the chan-
nel Cκ
R
(ℓ) is that for all s ∈ supp(Gen(1κ )) and every sequence
of inputs x1,x2, . . . , xℓ(κ), with xi ∈ supp(GenInput(1
κ )), for the
history
h = s | | x1 | | x2 | | . . . | | xℓ(κ)
the distribution of the sequences of documents
y1 | | y2 | | . . . | | yℓ(κ)
generated by the channel is exactly the same as the distribution for
R(s,x1) | | R(s,x2) | | . . . | | R(s,xℓ(κ)).
To give a formal definition of {Cκ
R
(ℓ)}κ∈N we need to specify the
probability distributions for any history h. Thus, we define the
family, on the alphabet {0, 1}, as follows: For empty history h = ∅,
we define Cκ
R
(ℓ)∅ as the distribution on all possible keys gener-
ated by Gen(1κ ). For s ∈ supp(Gen(1κ )) and a (possibly empty)
sequence inputs x1,x2, . . . , xr with xi ∈ supp(GenInput(1
κ )) and
0 ≤ r ≤ ℓ(κ) − 1, the distribution Cκ
R
(ℓ)s | |x1 | |x2 | |... | |xr is the distri-
bution on inputs xr+1 ← GenInput(1
κ ). For s ∈ supp(Gen(1κ )), a
sequence of inputs x1,x2, . . . ,xℓ(κ) with xi ∈ supp(GenInput(1
κ )),
and a (possibly empty) sequence of R’s outputs y1, . . . ,yr with
yi ∈ supp(R(s,x((i−1) mod ℓ(κ))+1)), the probability distribution of
Cκ
R
(ℓ)s | |x1 | |x2 | |... | |xℓ(κ ) | |y1 | |y2 | |... | |... | |yr is the probability distribu-
tion of R(s,x(r mod ℓ(κ))+1).
7.3 Results
The theorems proved in the previous section can simply be gener-
alized by using our general construction of the channel Ck
R
(ℓ) for
the randomized algorithm R and the generic stegosystem RejSamF
provided by Theorem 4.1.
Theorem 7.1. For every randomized algorithm R, there exists a
generic algorithm substitution attack ASA against R such that
InSec
ASA
ASA,R
(κ) ≤ O(ml(κ)4 · 2−H∞(C
κ ))+
O(ml(κ)2 · exp(−s)) + InSec
prf
F
(κ),
UnRel
⋆
S,C
(κ) ≤ 2ml(κ)2 · exp(−2H∞(C
κ )−3)+
ml(κ)2 · exp(−2−2s) + InSec
prf
F
(κ)
where C := Cκ
R
(S.ol(κ)).
Theorem 7.2. For all deterministic algorithms R and all algo-
rithm substitution attacks ASA against R:
InSec
asa
ASA,R(κ) = 1.
Theorem 1.2 is thus just a consequence of Theorem 7.1 and The-
orem 1.3 is just a consequence of Theorem 7.2.
These general results also imply several other results from the
literature, for example on signature schemes. Ateniese et al. [2]
study algorithm substitution attacks3 on signature schemes SIG =
(Gen, Sign,Vrfy), where
• The key generator SIG.Gen produces upon input 1κ a pair
(pk, sk) of keys with |pk| = |sk| = κ . We call pk the public
key and sk the secret key.
• The signing algorithm SIG.Sign takes as input the secret
key sk and a messagem ∈ {0, 1}SIG.ml of length SIG.ml(κ)
and produces a signatureσ ∈ {0, 1}SIG.sl(κ) of length SIG.sl(κ).
• The verifying algorithm SIG.Vrfy takes as input the public
key pk, the message m and a signature σ and outputs a
bit b .
On the positive side (from the view of an algorithm substitution
attack) they show that all randomized coin-injective schemes and
all coin-extractable schemes have ASA. A randomized algorithm A
is coin-injective, if the function fA(x, ρ) = A(x ; ρ) (where ρ denotes
the random coins used by A) is injective and coin-extractable if
there is another randomized algorithm B such that Pr[B(A(x ; ρ)) =
ρ] ≥ 1−negl for a negligible function negl. They prove the follow-
ing theorems:
3To be more precise, their attacks only replace the signing algorithm Sign.
Theorem 7.3 (Theorem 1 in [2]). For every coin-injective signa-
ture scheme SIG, there is a successful algorithm substitution attack
ASA and a negligible function negl such that
InSec
asa
ASA,SIG(κ) ≤ InSec
prf
F
(κ) + negl(κ)
for a pseudorandom function F.
Theorem 7.4 (Theorem 2 in [2]). For every coin-extractable sig-
nature scheme SIG, there is a successful algorithm substitution attack
ASA and a negligible function negl such that
InSec
asa
ASA,SIG(κ) ≤ negl(κ).
Both of these results are easily implied by Theorem 7.1.
On the negative side (from the view of an algorithm substitution
attack), they show that unique signature schemes are resistant to
ASAs fulfilling the verifiability condition. Informally this means
that (a) each message has exactly on signature (for a fixed key-pair)
and (b) each signature produced by the ASA must be valid.
Theorem7.5 (Theorem3 in [2]). For all unique signature schemes
SIG and all algorithm substitution attacksASA against them that ful-
fill the verifiability condition, there is a negligible function negl such
that
InSec
asa
ASA,SIG(κ) ≥ 1 − negl(κ).
Asunique signature schemes do not provide enoughmin-entropy
for a stegosystem, this results follows from Theorem 1.3.
8 A LOWER BOUND FOR UNIVERSAL ASA
A setting similar to steganography, where universal stegosystems
exist, that can be used for any channel of sufficiently large min-
entropy, would be quite useful for attackers that plan to launch
algorithm substitution attacks. Such a system would allow them
to attack any symmetric encryption scheme without knowing the
internal specification of the encryption algorithm. A closer look at
the results in [2, 6, 7] reveals that their attacks do indeed go with-
out internal knowledge of the used encryption algorithm. They
only manipulate the random coins used in the encryption process.
Note that SES.Enc(k,m; r ) (where r denotes the random coins used
by Enc) is a deterministic function, as SES.Enc is a PPTM.
We thus define a universal algorithm substitution attack as a
triple of PPTMs such that for every symmetric encryption scheme
SES, the triple
ASASES = (ASA.Gen,ASA.EncSES.Enc(·, ·;·),ASA.Ext)
is an ASA against SES. Hence, ASA.Enc has only oracle access
to the encryption algorithm SES.Enc of the encryption scheme: It
may thus choose arbitrary values k ,m, and r and receives a cipher-
text
c ← SES.Enc(k,m; r )
without having a complete description of the encryption schemes.
As noted above, all attacks in [2, 6, 7] are universal and Bellare et al.
explicitly state in their work [6] that their ASA works against any
encryption scheme of sufficiently large min-entropy. We also re-
mark that the rejection sampling ASA presented earlier is univer-
sal.
For a universal algorithm substitution attackASA and a symmet-
ric encryption scheme SES, let ASA.query(SES,κ, ak, am,k,m j ,σ )
be the expected number of oracle calls that a single call of the
substitution encoder ASA.EncSES.Enc(·, ·;·)(ak, am,k,m j ,σ ) makes
to its encryption oracle SES.Enc. We then define
ASA.query(SES,κ) =
max
ak∈supp(ASA.Gen(1κ )),
am∈{0,1}ASA.ml(κ ),
k ∈supp(SES.Gen(1κ )),
m∈{0,1}SES.ml(κ ),
σ ∈{0,1}∗
{ASA.query(SES,κ, ak, am,k,m j ,σ )}.
For a family F of encryption schemes, let ASA.query(F ,κ) be the
maximal value of ASA.query(SES,κ) for SES ∈ F .
In the steganographic setting, Dedić et al. showed in [12] that
(under the cryptographic assumption that one-way functions exist)
no universal stegosystem can embed more than O(1) · log(κ) bits
per document and thus proved that the rejection sampling based
systems have optimal rate. The needed ingredients of this proof are
summarized by two key lemmas based on Lemma 12 and Lemma
13 in [9].
Lemma 8.1. Let ASA be a algorithm substitution attack for the
symmetric encryption scheme SES such that ASA is secure against
SES. Then for all integers κ ∈ N, messagesm ∈ {0, 1}ASA.ml(κ), ci-
phertexts c1, c2, . . . , cASA.ol(κ) ← ASA.Enc(ak, am,k,m,σ ) and all
positions i ∈ {1, . . . ,ASA.ol(κ)}:
Pr
ak←ASA.Gen(1κ )
[ci < supp(SES.Enc(k,m))] ≤ InSec
enc-watch
ASA,SES (κ).
Lemma 8.2. Let ASA be a universal and reliable algorithm sub-
stitution attack against the symmetric encryption scheme SES. Then
for every κ , the probability that the encoder ASA.Enc produces a ci-
phertext, which was not provided by the encryption oracle, is at least
1 − UnRelASA,SES(κ) −
(ASA.ol(κ) · ASA.query(SES,κ))ASA.ol(κ)
2ASA.ml(κ)
.
We will now show how one can modify an existing symmet-
ric encryption scheme SES with the help of a signature scheme
SIG into a family of encryption schemes such that no universal
ASA can achieve a super-logarithmic rate on all of these encryp-
tion schemes. The construction is very similar to the construction
used in [9].
A signature scheme SIG = (SIG.Gen, SIG.Sign, SIG.Vrfy) is a
triple of probabilistic polynomial-time algorithms with the follow-
ing properties:
• The key generator SIG.Gen produces upon input 1κ a pair
(pk, sk) of keys with |pk| = |sk| = κ . We call pk the public
key and sk the secret key.
• The signing algorithm SIG.Sign takes as input the secret
key sk and a messagem ∈ {0, 1}SIG.ml of length SIG.ml(κ)
and produces a signatureσ ∈ {0, 1}SIG.sl(κ) of length SIG.sl(κ).
• The verifying algorithm SIG.Vrfy takes as input the public
key pk, the messagem and a signature σ and outputs a bit
b .
We say that (Gen, Sign,Vrfy) is reliable, ifVrfy(pk,m,Sign(sk,m)) =
1 for all pk, sk andm.
A forger Fo is a probabilistic polynomial time algorithm that
upon input pk and oracle access to Signsk tries to produce a pair
(m,σ ) such that Vrfypk(m,σ ) = 1. Formally, this is defined via the
following experiment Sig-Forge:
Sig-ForgeFo,SIG(κ)
Parties: Forger Fo, Signature Scheme SIG =
(Gen, Sign,Vrfy)
Input: length κ
1: (pk, sk) ← Gen(1κ )
2: (m,σ ) ← FoSignsk (pk)
3: Let Q be the set of messages given to Signsk by Fo
4: if m < Q and Vrfypk(m,σ ) = 1 then return 1
5: else return 0
Algorithm 6: Sig-ForgeFo,SIG(κ): Signature-Forging Experi-
ment
A signature scheme SIG is called existentially unforgeable, if for
every forger Fo, there is a negligible function negl such that
Adv
sig
Fo,SIG
(κ) := Pr[Sig-ForgeFo,SIG(κ) = 1] ≤ negl(κ).
The maximal advantage of any forger against SIG is called the
insecurity of SIG and is defined as
InSec
sig
SIG
(κ) := max
Fo
{Adv
sig
Fo,SIG
(κ)}.
For (pk, sk) ∈ supp(SIG.Gen(1κ )), let SESpk,sk be the encryption
scheme with
• SESpk,sk.Gen = SES.Gen, i. e. the key generation algo-
rithm remains the same.
• The encryption algorithm SESpk,sk.Enc is given as:
SESpk,sk.Enc
Input: key k , messagem
1: c ← SES.Enc(k,m)
2: ← SIG.Sign(sk, c)
3: return (c,σ )
Algorithm 7: Encryption Algorithm
• Similarly, the decryption algorithm SESpk,sk.Dec is given
as:
SESpk,sk.Dec
Input: key k , ciphertext (c,σ )
1: if SIG.Vrfy(pk, c,σ ) = 1 then
2: return SES.Dec(k, c)
3: else return ⊥
Algorithm 8: Decryption Algorithm
By using this family
F (SES, SIG) = {SESpk,sk}(pk,sk)∈supp(SIG.Gen(1κ )),
we can derive the following upper bound on the rate of each
universal ASA:
Theorem 8.3. Let SES be a symmetric encryption scheme, SIG be
a signature scheme and F = F (SES, SIG) be defined as above. For
every universal algorithm substitution attack ASA against SES, there
exist a forger Fo on SIG with advantage at least
1 − InSecenc-watch
ASA,F
(κ) − UnRelASA,F(κ) − φ(ASA,κ)
for every κ , where
φ(ASA,κ) =
(ASA.ol(κ) · ASA.query(F ,κ))ASA.ol(κ)
2ASA.ml(κ)
.
Proof. The proof is analogue to the proof of [9, Theorem 13].
Fix κ ∈ N and (pk, sk) ∈ supp(SIG.Gen(1κ )). We will now con-
struct an forger on SIG with the help of the algorithm substitu-
tion attacker ASA. Choose a random attacker message am∗ ←
{0, 1}ASA.ml(κ), a random attacker key ak∗ ← ASA.Gen(1κ ), a
random message m∗ ← {0, 1}SES.ml(κ) and a random key k∗ ←
SES.Gen(1κ ).
The forger now simulates the run of the algorithm substitution
attack ASA.EncSESpk, sk .Enc(·, ·;·)(ak∗, am∗,k∗,m∗) against the sym-
metric encryption scheme SESpk,sk. Whenever ASA.Enc makes
an access (k,m; r ) to its encryption oracle, the forger computes
c = SES.Enc(k,m; r ) and uses its signing oracle SIG.Signsk upon
c . This returns a valid signature σ for c and the forger returns
(c,σ ) to ASA.Enc. This simulation hence yields the same result
as ASA.EncSESpk, sk.Enc(·, ·;·)(ak∗, am∗,k∗,m∗). Denote the first doc-
ument produced by the run of the algorithm substitution attack
ASA.EncSESpk, sk .Enc(·, ·;·)(ak∗, am∗,k∗,m∗) as (̂c, σ̂ ). By Theorem 8.1,
the probability that the pair (̂c, σ̂ ) does not belong to to the support
supp(SESpk,sk.Enc(k,m)) (i. e. it is no valid ciphertext-signature
pair) is bounded by InSecenc-watch
ASA,SESpk, sk
(κ). Furthermore, Theorem 8.2
implies that the probability that (̂c, σ̂ ) is equal to any (c,σ ) which
was given to the ASA is at most UnRelASA,SESpk, sk (κ) + φ(ASA,κ).
We can thus conclude that with probability
1− InSecenc-watchASA,SESpk, sk
(κ) − UnRelASA,SESpk, sk (κ)−
(ASA.ol(κ) · ASA.query(SESpk,sk,κ))
ASA.ol(κ)
2ASA.ml(κ)
,
the ciphertext-signature pair (̂c, σ̂ ) is a valid ciphertext-signature
pair and was not produced by the oracle SIG.Signsk The advantage
of the forger against the signature scheme SIG is thus at least
1− InSecenc-watchASA,SESpk, sk (κ) − UnRelASA,SESpk, sk (κ)−
(ASA.ol(κ) · ASA.query(SESpk,sk,κ))
ASA.ol(κ)
2ASA.ml(κ)
,
The running time of the forger is polynomial in κ due to the poly-
nomial running time of ASA.Enc. 
This allows us to conclude the following corollary bounding the
number of bits embeddable into a single ciphertext by a universal
algorithm substitution attack.
Corollary 8.4. There is no universal algorithm substitution at-
tack that embeds more than O(1) · log(κ) bits per ciphertext (unless
one-way functions do not exist).
9 CONCLUSIONS
In this work, we proved that ASAs in the strong undetectability
model of Bellare, Jaeger and Kane [6] are a special case of stegosys-
tems on a certain kind of channels described by symmetric en-
cryption schemes. This gives a rigorous proof of the well-known
connection between steganography and algorithm substitution at-
tacks. We make use of this relationship to show that a wide range
of results on ASAs are already present in the steganographic liter-
ature. Inspired by this connection, we define universal ASAs that
work with no knowledge on the internal implementation of the
symmetric encryption schemes and thus work for all such encryp-
tion schemes with sufficiently large min-entropy. As almost all
known ASAs are universal, we investigate their rate – the number
of embedded bits per ciphertext – and prove a logarithmic upper
bound of this rate.
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